Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-European exchange rate misalignments: The challenge of sustainable adjustments in the eurozone by Duwicquet, Vincent et al.
Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-European exchange
rate misalignments
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier, Jamel Saadaoui
To cite this version:
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier, Jamel Saadaoui. Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-
European exchange rate misalignments: The challenge of sustainable adjustments in the euro-
zone. Economics, Economic Policies and Sustainable Growth in the Wake of the Crisis, 8-10
September, 2016, Ancona, Italy, Sep 2016, Ancoˆne, Italy. <http://crisis2016.univpm.it/>.
<hal-01359820>
HAL Id: hal-01359820
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01359820
Submitted on 4 Sep 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-European exchange 
rate misalignments: The challenge of sustainable 
adjustments in the eurozone 
 
Manuscript prepared for the conference: Economics, Economic Policies and Sustainable 
Growth in the Wake of the Crisis, 8-10 September, 2016, Ancona, Italy 
 
Vincent Duwicquet*   Jacques Mazier**   Jamel Saadaoui*** 
 
Abstract: The euro crisis sheds light on the nature of alternative adjustment mechanisms in a 
heterogeneous monetary union. Exchange rate adjustments being impossible, it remains very 
few efficient alternative mechanisms. At the level of the whole eurozone the euro is close to its 
equilibrium parity. But the euro remains overvalued for Southern European countries, France 
included, and largely undervalued for Northern European countries, especially for Germany. 
This paper gives a new evaluation of these exchange rate misalignments inside the eurozone 
thanks to a FEER approach. In a second step, we use a two-country SFC model of a monetary 
union with endogenous interest rates and Eurobonds. Overvaluations amount to negative 
competitiveness shocks in Southern countries. In this respect, three main results are found. 
Firstly, an increase of intra-European financing by banks of northern countries or other 
institutions could contribute to reduce the debt burden and induce a partial recovery but public 
debt would increase. Secondly, the implementation of Eurobonds as a tool to partially mutualize 
European sovereign debt would have a rather similar positive impact with a public debt limited 
to 70 percent of GDP. Thirdly, Eurobonds could also be used to finance large European projects 
which could impulse a stronger recovery in the entire zone with stabilized current account 
balances. 
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1. Introduction 
“The second implication of the absence of fiscal transfers is that countries need to invest 
more in other mechanisms to share the cost of shocks. Even with more flexible economies, 
internal adjustment will always be slower than it would be if countries had their own 
exchange rate. Risk-sharing is thus essential to prevent recessions from leaving permanent 
scars and reinforcing economic divergence.” 
Mario Draghi (2015). 
The euro crisis sheds light on the nature of alternative adjustment mechanisms in a 
heterogeneous monetary union. Adjustment mechanisms are defined in a broad sense as 
mechanisms that ensure a return to the initial situation or, possibly, to recover towards full 
employment after a slowdown. It remains very few efficient alternative mechanisms in the 
absence of exchange rate flexibility as underlined by the quotation of Mario Draghi. Budgetary 
policy could play a major role. In the United States, budgetary policy stabilizes 20 percent of 
shocks on the GDP (Italianer and Pisani-Ferry, 1992). But there is no equivalent in the European 
case.  
Well integrated capital markets, with portfolio diversification and intra-zone credit, have been 
proposed as a powerful adjustment mechanism by the “international risk sharing” approach. 
Intra-zone credit and capital income from international portfolio could absorb near from 40 to 
60 percent of the shocks (Asdrubali and Kim, 2004). These results have been used during the 
2000 by proponents of liberal economic policies in the EU to promote a deeper financial 
integration instead of having to develop a federal budget (European Commission, 2007; Trichet, 
2007)1.  
                                                 
1 Mario Draghi (2015) acknowledges the crucial role of budgetary policies and that this approach “the less public 
risk-sharing we want, the more private risk-sharing we need” could be insufficient in case of financial storms in 
the future. However, he concludes that Members States should achieve structural reforms to have sound public 
finances in order to be able to deal with periods of financial and economic turmoil. 
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This approach is still present in the last Action Plan of the European Commission (2015) on the 
Capital Market Union with the goal of creating one single market for shares, bonds and 
securitized bank loans. However, the theoretical basis, the empirical methodology and the 
results seem to be highly questionable (Clévenot and Duwicquet, 2011). 
Consequently, relative wage and price flexibility are proposed in order to take place, at least 
partially, of exchange rate adjustments. Actually, these mechanisms allow only a very slow and 
partial return to equilibrium with an important cost in terms of growth and employment and 
with large differences between countries, due to huge structural specificities. They are more 
inefficient when they are implemented simultaneously in interdependent countries, as it is the 
case in the eurozone, especially in the Southern European countries. They are more efficient in 
a largely opened economy like Ireland than in rather closed ones like Greece or even Portugal 
(Mazier and Saglio, 2008). 
At the level of the whole eurozone, the current account is close to equilibrium and the fiscal 
deficit is smaller than in many other OECD countries. The euro is close to its equilibrium parity 
but intra-European imbalances are huge. 
The euro is strongly overvalued for Southern European countries, France included, and largely 
undervalued for Northern European countries, especially for Germany (Jeong et al., 2010). 
These overvaluations slow growth and induce fiscal and current deficits in the South while 
undervaluations boost growth in the North via exports, especially towards the rest of the 
eurozone, and deficits are reduced. This situation is equivalent to implicit positive transfers in 
favor of the North and negative transfers at the detriment of the South, which are largely ignored 
in the public debate. 
In order to investigate these issues, Duwicquet et al. (2013) have used a two-country Stock-
Flow Consistent (hereafter, SFC) model of a monetary union along the lines of Godley and 
Lavoie (2006, 2007a, 2007b), Lavoie (2003) and Duwicquet and Mazier (2010, 2011). The 
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model described the real sector and assets and liabilities of economic agents in order to analyze 
financial integration in a consistent manner. A federal budget has been introduced with federal 
expenditures and social transfers financed by federal taxes and Eurobonds issuance. The 
stabilizing role of such a federal budget has been confirmed facing asymmetric shocks or, 
equivalently, exchange rate misalignments within the monetary union. Similarly, the stabilizing 
role of Eurobonds, used to finance European investment projects, has been illustrated. But the 
model was limited to exogenous interest rates, which can only be regarded as a preliminary 
step, as we have witnessed large movements of interest rates in Southern European countries 
since the onset of the euro crisis.  
This paper is organized as follow. In a first part, we give a new evaluation of these exchange 
rate misalignments inside the eurozone, using a FEER approach, and we discuss the structural 
heterogeneity of the eurozone. In a second part, we introduce an SFC model of a monetary 
union with endogenous interest rates. With this model, we examine to what extent these 
asymmetric evolutions due to intra-European misalignments can be adjusted. Interest rates on 
public bonds are now endogenous. Fiscal policy is partially endogenous and reacts to financial 
markets evolution with the implementation of budget cuts. An increase of intra-zone financing 
allows to contain upward pressure on interest rates. Eurobonds are introduced and used in two 
ways, on the one hand, in order to mutualize a part of the European public debts and, in the 
other hand, to finance European investments in growth sectors. A combination of tax rebate and 
budget cuts is also investigated. 
 
2. Intra-European exchange rates misalignments and structural 
heterogeneity 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, a surge of current account imbalances within the eurozone 
has been observed in spite of a rather balanced current account for the whole area. On the one 
side, Northern European countries have accumulated huge current account surpluses and on the 
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other side, Southern European countries have run important current account deficits. After 
2009, current account deficits of Southern European countries have been reduced mainly 
because of restrictive policies and internal devaluations. These evolutions reflect, at least 
partially, the increasing exchange rate misalignments inside the eurozone. Thanks to a FEER 
approach, introduced by Williamson (1983), Jeong et alii (2010) and Duwicquet et alii (2013) 
have shown a divergence within the eurozone between some countries increasingly undervalued 
(like Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland) and others increasingly overvalued (like 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and France). 
Table 1: Misalignments in real effective terms (in percent) 
 EU FRA GER ITA SPA AUT FIN IRL NLD PRT GRC 
1994 -3.4 2.4 -7.4 6.9 1.4 4.8 -5.8 -0.7 -5.3 0.9 15.1 
1995 1.2 -0.7 -7.5 8.2 9.6 -1.5 5.1 -1.7 -7.5 3.8 -0.1 
1996 4.2 3.2 -4.8 6.7 -0.1 -4.1 8.3 -0.8 -7.2 -10.4 -11.3 
1997 3.5 12.9 -1.6 5.4 1.1 -6.1 20.1 -1.5 -3.5 -18.5 -8.2 
1998 0.6 14.0 -4.3 2.1 0.5 0.6 22.9 -2.6 -6.6 -16.8 -1.7 
1999 2.0 19.2 -7.3 -1.5 -5.0 -2.0 21.6 -0.3 -3.3 -21.4 -7.2 
2000 0.1 8.7 -8.1 -3.8 -7.6 1.4 24.9 -0.6 -6.7 -29.3 -16.8 
2001 6.9 6.8 -2.9 -3.1 -7.9 -7.1 25.3 -4.0 -9.5 -36.1 -17.4 
2002 6.6 2.5 3.8 -6.3 -4.8 5.7 25.6 -4.8 -13.4 -30.1 -19.0 
2003 2.2 -2.9 1.3 -8.5 -3.2 -0.4 15.2 -3.6 -7.7 -26.1 -9.1 
2004 7.2 -0.1 5.6 -5.4 -15.4 -4.0 19.6 -3.8 -5.2 -40.1 5.0 
2005 1.9 -4.6 5.3 -4.1 -20.3 -2.2 7.8 -4.8 -5.7 -46.1 -7.6 
2006 1.6 -4.8 9.1 -3.8 -24.6 4.0 9.7 -2.0 -1.6 -47.9 -6.3 
2007 -0.2 -6.0 13.1 -0.7 -26.4 11.3 15.5 -0.9 -1.5 -34.5 -5.2 
2008 0.9 -13.3 13.0 -4.5 -33.3 13.7 11.7 -4.7 -3.1 -46.3 -3.7 
2009 6.6 -8.3 13.9 -2.9 -10.2 3.0 0.2 -0.7 -2.7 -34.4 -8.5 
2010 4.9 -6.9 16.8 -4.2 -14.6 5.0 2.5 -0.9 0.0 -28.1 -21.1 
2011 8.6 -10.1 16.8 -5.8 -22.9 2.6 -5.9 -2.5 -1.2 -19.6 -53.1 
2012 16.3 -12.6 19.3 -2.5 -14.1 1.5 -8.9 -7.9 -2.1 -12.2 -30.9 
2013 18.0 -5.0 18.7 1.5 -3.6 2.2 -7.2 1.4 -0.9 6.8 -20.3 
2014 20.1 -10.1 19.4 3.8 -2.7 -0.9 -7.4 5.9 -0.8 4.4 -15.4 
2015 26.1 -8.2 18.7 2.4 6.1 -2.3 -6.7 12.8 -3.9 8.6 1.9 
2016 28.6 -5.2 15.8 2.0 14.3 -4.1 -8.6 11.7 -5.2 14.1 -5.2 
Notes: Forecasts for 2016 based on IMF WEO April 2016; See Jeong et al. (2010) for a complete description of 
the model of world trade and the methodology used to compute misalignments. Source: authors’ calculations. A 
positive (negative) number indicates an undervaluation (overvaluation) expressed in percent of the observed value. 
See appendix A for details about the methodology used to correct current account balances from the effect of 
differences between output gaps in the eurozone. This correction, especially important after the crisis (due to a de-
synchronization of business cycles in the euro area), is based on Bayoumi and Faruqee (1998). 
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As we can see in table 1, on average between 2005 and 2010, Germany, Austria, Netherlands 
and Finland have been undervalued by 13 percent while Greece, Portugal, Spain and France 
have been overvalued by 23 percent. These intra-European exchange rate misalignments reflect 
a strong structural heterogeneity between European countries at several levels (nature of the 
international specialization, size and productivity of the firms, R&D effort and qualification of 
the labor force). They are at the heart of the current woes of the eurozone. However, since the 
onset of the euro crisis in 2010, a reduction of misalignments has been observed for most of the 
Southern European countries. Irish, Spanish, Italian and even Portuguese euros seemed no more 
overvalued in 2013. But Greek and French euros remained overvalued by around 15 percent 
and German euro undervalued by around 20 percent in 2014. These movements have been 
mainly driven by large real effective devaluations in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, as 
shown in figure 1 with the evolutions of the relative unit labor cost (RULC). 
Figure 1: Real effective exchange rates based on unit labor cost 
  
Source: authors’ calculations based on European Commission data (AMECO), basis 100 in 2000. 
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These politics of internal devaluation have been very painful and has led to a deep recession in 
Greece, as in other Southern European countries. We have observed a reduction of current 
account deficits mainly due to the reduction of imports. However, ex-post improvement of 
public finances had been limited. 
The financial crisis of 2008 was, in any case, due to a rise of public deficits and debts. 
Nevertheless, it has led to a huge increase in the government deficits and debts due to measures 
implemented to rescue banks and support the economic activity and, also, to the fall of tax 
incomes induced by the recession. The European Central Bank (hereafter, ECB) switched to a 
more active monetary policy. But the weakest European countries faced difficulties to finance 
their deficits as the financial markets feared sovereign debt default. As they could not attack 
national currencies thanks to the monetary union, the financial markets concentrated their 
attacks on the public bonds. Interest rates soared, first, in Ireland and in Greece, then in other 
Southern European countries while they remained very low in Germany, but also in France.  
Figure 2: 10-years government real interest rates in percent 
 
Source: ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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The true existence of the monetary union was at stake and a reversal only took place after the 
announcement of the ECB in September 2012 to intervene without restriction on the public 
bonds secondary markets in case of necessity (see figure 2). 
But this ECB intervention was accompanied by very restrictive fiscal policies in the framework 
of the Fiscal Pact and by structural reforms in favor of more liberalization. 
On the whole, results have been uneven amongst member states. Real devaluation has been 
inefficient in Greece and, to a large extent, in Portugal due to their limited degree of trade 
openness and the social costs have been important. Combined with restrictive fiscal policies, it 
has led to a deep recession which has limited the improvement of public finances. The public 
debt ratio has increased massively.  
In Ireland and, to a less extent, in Spain the real devaluation has been more operational thanks 
to the role played by the export sector but the initial negative shock has not been offset and the 
rate of unemployment remained important (in January 2016, the unemployment rate was 8.9 
percent in Ireland and 20.5 percent in Spain).  
In Germany, between 2000 and 2008, sharp wage and productivity adjustments have led to a 
large reduction of the German relative unit labor cost. These adjustments have been preserved 
during the crisis. 
On the opposite, in France, the successive governments have been reluctant to implement cost 
adjustments and the euro remained overvalued. The strategy adopted has been, since 2013, to 
reduce costs through tax rebates (around 1.5 percent of GDP). The target of these measures is 
not clear and they raise, at least, two questions. If the government wants to improve the 
competitiveness, this measure is inaccurate as all the firms, including those of the non-tradable 
sector like banks and retailers, can benefit from the tax rebates. Consequently, the transfer in 
favor of the tradable sector is too limited, compared with the cost disadvantage which currently 
prevail. A larger transfer would be necessary but could not be easily supported by public 
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finances. If the target is to improve employment, as it seems to be more the case with the “Pacte 
de responsabilité et de solidarité”, the past experiences show that efficiency is not warranted 
and the problem of cost-competitiveness, which cannot be ignored, is not solved. The 
government is aware of these limits and has completed his array of measures by re-launching 
industrial policy measures (major industrial projects, innovation policy, etc.) to improve non-
price competitiveness. Nevertheless, this kind of measures takes a long time (around 10 years) 
to be fully operational. 
The risk is, therefore, that any target can be reached. The competitiveness problem will remain 
and financing the current account deficit might become more important. Tax rebates could have 
a limited impact on employment, since profit rates have been squeezed during the crisis, 
especially for the export sector. The financing of the tax rebates will imply substantial 
expenditures cuts. Thus, the more likely outcome would be a long lasting period of stagnation.  
In this context, it is worthwhile, using an SFC model of a monetary union, to assess various 
alternative economic policies scenarios which try to tackle this problem of intra-European 
misalignments. 
 
3. SFC modeling of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union 
3.1. The structure of the model 
An SFC model allows to obtain a consistent description of assets and liabilities of all associated 
real and financial flows in a monetary union. This monetary union is composed of two countries 
( n  and s ) with an asymmetry of size. The country n  is five times larger than the country s . 
This configuration eases the exploration of the adjustment mechanisms of the country s  facing 
the rest of the monetary union. 
We introduce in this model the possibility of public federal expenditures and Eurobonds. This 
will open the road to investigate stabilizing effects of Eurobonds. Firms can accumulate both 
real and financial capital. They can finance their investments by non-distributed profits, bank 
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loans or equities. Commercial banks are able to supply credit and to ration credit. The single 
central bank (i.e. the ECB) refinances the commercial banks. Households hold banking 
deposits, bonds and equities. The two national governments issue bonds and Treasury bills. 
In table 2, we describe the balance sheet in terms of assets (written with a positive sign) and 
liabilities (written with a negative sign) of each sector: households, firms, government, 
commercial banks, the single central bank and a federal budget. 
 
Table 2: Balance sheet of a monetary union 
 Country n   Country s   
 HH  F  G  B  FB  ECB  HH  F  G  B     
C   nk       sk    0 
D  nbd    nbd    sbd    sbd  0 
Cs  nhh    nh   h  shh    sh  0 
Cr  
 nl   
n
nl       0
n
sl   
0 
   
s
nl       
s
sl  
R     nrf   n srf rf     srf  0 
Bd  
n
n npb b   n npb b     
n
n spb b     
0 
s
s npb b       
s
s spb b     
E      nbte       0 
Bi  
  nbt  
n
nbt       0
n
sbt   
0 
   
s
nbt       
s
sbt  
Eq  
n
n npe eh  
n
n npe ee      
n
n spe eh  
n
n spe ee    
0 
 n npe e          
s
s npe eh  
s
s npe ee      
s
s spe eh  
s
s spe ee    
0 
       s spe e    
W  nvh  nv  nd  nvb  nde   svh  sv  sd  svb  0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Notes: For the agents in the economy, HH  stands for households, F  for firms, G  for national government, B  
for private banks and FB  stands for federal budget or a federal institution in charge of the emission of Eurobonds. 
For the type of financial assets held and issued in the economy, C  stands for physical capital, D  for deposits, 
Cs   for cash, Cr  for credit, R  for advances of the central bank, Bd  for bonds, E  for Eurobonds, Bi  for bills, 
Eq  for equities and W  stands for wealth. 
 
sl
s spb b
nbte sbte
sbt
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Beyond physical capital ( k ), eight kinds of monetary or financial assets are distinguished2: 
bank deposits ( bd ) held by households, bonds issued by governments ( .pb b ) and held by 
households of both countries, loans ( l ) supplied by each commercial bank to firms of the two 
countries, equities issued by firms ( .pe e ) and held by households and firms of both countries, 
Treasury bills issued by each State ( bt ) and held by commercial banks of both countries, high 
powered money ( h ) held by households ( hh ) as well as by commercial banks (mandatory 
reserves), advances supplied by the central bank to commercial banks ( rf ) and finally 
Eurobonds ( bte ) issued by a federal authority and held by banks. 
Our model relies on the main features of the contributions of Duwicquet and Mazier (2010, 
2011) and Duwicquet et al. (2013). Nevertheless, several crucial changes are included to 
examine current developments in the eurozone crisis: 
 
 Interest rates on Treasury bills supplied by the State are endogenous. The demand of 
Treasury bills by private banks is an increasing function of interest rate. Thus, in case 
of an insufficient demand, this mechanism induces upward pressures on interest rates. 
 Budgetary policy is partially endogenous and is linked to financial markets. When 
interest rates on sovereign debt increase, the national government can reduce public 
expenditures in reaction. 
 The possibility to increase intra-zone financing is introduced in order to reduce the 
pressure on interest rates. This can be achieved through foreign banks purchases of 
public bonds or Treasury bills, through the European Stability Mechanism or even 
through direct intervention of the central bank on the public bond markets.  
                                                 
2 When there are two symbols ( n  and s ), the subscript denotes the country where the asset is held, the superscript 
the country where the asset is issued. For example, 
s
nbt  represents the amount of bills held by country n  and 
issued by the country s . 
11 
 The role of Eurobonds is examined in two ways. On the one hand, Eurobonds are 
aimed at mutualizing a part of sovereign debt in the eurozone. On the other hand, 
Eurobonds could be used to finance European investment projects in several sectors 
namely education, health and innovation. 
 Last the rather traditional policy mix combining tax rebates and expenditures cuts 
(roughly the French government strategy) is also discussed. 
 
The main equations are presented below. The model has been calibrated to represent the 
structure of the European Monetary Union. The value of coefficients and the entire model are 
available in the working paper version of this text3. 
 
The demand side 
The model dynamics relies essentially on the investment function. As we can see below, 
investment reacts positively to the rate of profit and to variation of aggregate demand. It 
responds negatively to the debt structure and to credit costs. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 4
( 1) ( 1)
( 2) ( 1) ( 1)
n n n
n n n n n nn n sn s
n n n
up y l
g k k k k k rl k rl
k y k
  
     
  
  [1] 
where g  stands for the rate of accumulation of physical capital; up  represents the amount of 
undistributed profits; l  is the firms’ indebtedness; rl  is the credit cost and y  is the gross 
domestic product. 
At the macroeconomic level, an increase in investment spending will generate more profits. 
These profits will be, on the one hand, distributed in part to shareholders (here, households and 
other firms) and, on the other hand, undistributed. 
 
                                                 
3 The EViews codes used for the numeric simulations are, also, available from the authors upon request. 
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The household consumption function includes a positive wealth effect. This wealth effect 
describes the behavior of households which target a constant ratio between wealth and 
disposable income. 
 0 1 2 ( 1)n n n n n nc a a yh a vh      [2] 
where vh  stands for the households’ wealth and yh  for the disposable income with capital 
gains. 
The disposable income of households is defined as the sum of after-tax labor incomes (wages) 
and after-tax capital incomes (interest rates and dividends). A part of disposable income 
augmented with capital gains is consumed whereas the residual saving corresponds to bank 
deposits, money holdings and to financial assets (bonds supplied by the State and equities 
supplied by private firms). The financial wealth covers a large array of financial assets (bank 
deposits, cash money, equities and bonds). 
The government receives taxes from households and banks, spends and pays interests. The 
public deficit is financed by issuance of bonds and Treasury bills. Supply of Treasury bills 
balances the gap between public deficit and bonds issuance thus: 
 ( 1) ( 1)n n n n n n n n n n n n nbt gn r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf                [3] 
where bt  is the amount of T-bills; gn  stands for the national public expenditures; r  is the 
interest rate on T-bills; b represents the amount of bond issued; t  are the taxes paid by the 
households; tb  are the taxes paid by commercial banks; teb  are the taxes paid by the ECB; tf  
are the taxes paid by firms; ps  stands for social benefits and cl  for firms’ social contributions. 
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The banking sector  
The central bank supplies money and provides an unlimited amount of refinancing to private 
banks at the key interest rate ( ib ) thus acting as the lender of last resort. The interest rate on 
bank deposit ( id ) is simply determined with a margin on the key interest rate of the central 
bank. 
 
n s n s
n n n n n n n nrf h l l bt bt bp bd            [4] 
 2bid ib m    [5] 
The central bank does not make any profit as in Godley and Lavoie (2007). Thus interests paid 
to the central bank are equal to taxes paid to the State. This is in line with the practice of most 
modern central banks in the world economy. 
Besides, commercial banks supply the entire amount of demanded credit: 
 n s
n n n n n n n s nl inv up pe e pe ee pe ee            [6] 
The credit market is open to foreign banks. We suppose that banks of the smaller country 
(country s ) do not lend to firms of the larger country n  ( 0nsl  ). Bank loans are allocated 
between domestic and foreign firms relatively to their respective trade openness. The interest 
rate on bank loans is endogenous and depends on the lagged value of Treasury bills’ rate of 
each country and on their own lagged value. 
 (1 ) ( 1) . ( 1)n n nrl a rl a r       [7] 
 (1 ) ( 1) . ( 1)s s srl a rl a r       [8] 
Treasury bills play a key role in the model resolution. Banks purchase a limited amount of 
Treasury bills with a demand which depends positively on the rate of interest. Thus interest 
rates become endogenous, as they adjust the supply of Treasury bills determined by the public 
deficit (which has to be financed) and the private demand of Treasury bills in each country. 
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Bills issued by the southern country and domestically held in the private sector ( s
sbt ) as well as 
bills held in the rest of the union ( s
nbt ) depends on the interest rates differential between the two 
countries: 
1 2
s
s
ss s ss ns
bt
a r a r
y
   
1 2
s
n
ns s ns nn
bt
a r a r
y
   
By summing demands of these two countries, we obtain the global demand for Treasury bills 
issued by the southern country: 
   1 2 1 2s ss s ss n s ns s ns n nbt a r a r y a r a r y     
The interest rate on Treasury bills issued by the southern country becomes endogenous and we 
can write: 
 
   
   
2 2
1 1
s ss n s ns n n
s
ss s ns n
bt a r y a r y
r
a y a y
 


  [9] 
 
Regarding the rest of the union (the northern country), we assume that the southern country 
does not hold bills issued by the northern country which finances its public deficit only 
domestically: 
0nsbt   
n n
nbt bt  
The global demand for Treasury bills issued by the northern country depends on the level of 
interest rate ( nr ) and the national income ( ny ): 
 1
2
n nn nn
n
nn
r a y
bt
b

  
Consequently, we have the following interest rate determination for the northern country: 
 21
nn n
n nn
n
b bt
r a
y
    [10] 
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After an increase of public deficit, the public deficit remains financed by commercial banks. 
However, the level of interest rates is higher. This tightening of financial conditions is partially 
transmitted to rates on bank loans granted to firms and to interest rates on public bonds which 
are supposed to be equal to interest rates on Treasury bills. 
 
Baseline scenario 
Our model represents a monetary union characterized by a sluggish growth in the baseline 
scenario (around 1 percent per year). Several sensitivity tests have been conducted on the most 
relevant parameters (see appendix D). They indicate a rather good robustness of the results. 
From this baseline scenario, we simulate an asymmetric loss of competitiveness in the southern 
country due to an exchange rate misalignment. As underlined by Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2012), overvaluations induce distortions in prices of internationally traded goods. Thus, 
cumulative effects of overvaluations amount to negative competitiveness shock. To illustrate 
this loss of competitiveness, the term ti  is equal to 10 between periods 10 and 45 in the import 
equations: 
 0 1 2 2log( ) log( ) log log
n s
n n n n
n s
w ti w ti
im y
y y
   
    
      
   
  [11] 
 0 1 2 2log( ) log( ) log log
s n
s s s s
s n
w ti w ti
im y
y y
   
    
      
   
  [12] 
This shock deteriorates the current account of the southern country and improves external trade 
of the northern country. Consequently, we observe a decline of national income in the South 
and an increase of national income in the North. In order to investigate the current developments 
of the eurozone crisis, we compare the effect of this shock in different versions of the model. 
In addition to the baseline scenario, five versions of the model will be examined. 
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3.2. Alternative scenarios of economic policies 
Scenario 1: Budget cuts 
In this first scenario, public expenditures become endogenous and react to rising interest rates 
on Treasury bills: 
 
1 2( 1) ( 1)n gg n gg n ngn a gn a r bt      [13] 
In line with the objectives of the revised Stability and Growth Pact as well as aims of the Fiscal 
Compact, we assume that the government targets to reach a debt-GDP ratio of 70 percent in 
period 45. To achieve this challenge, the government progressively reduces its public 
expenditures. The speed of public expenditures reduction is governed by the evolution of 
interest rates. The year of the shock, public expenditures decrease by 0.2 percent of GDP 
relatively to the baseline scenario. In the baseline scenario, public expenditures amount to 19.5 
percent of GDP in period 45. In this first scenario, they drop to 12 percent of GDP in period 45. 
Scenario 2: Intra zone financing 
We investigate, here, implications of financial support granted by the northern country to the 
southern country. In the wake of a loss of competitiveness in the southern country, the issuance 
of public securities will rise to finance an increasing deficit. We assume that private banks of 
the northern country will sustain a supplementary demand to bring down interest rates. This 
scenario can also be seen as an illustration of the European Stability Mechanism where northern 
countries grant loans with low rates of interest to southern countries. Similar effects are also 
expected if the ECB purchases directly Treasury bills of southern countries. In each case, the 
southern country receives financial aid to substantially reduce the debt burden. 
Scenario 3: Issuance of Eurobonds   
In this scenario, Eurobonds are issued in order to partially mutualize sovereign debt of southern 
countries. We assume that there is threshold (a debt-GDP ratio of 60 percent) from which 
Eurobonds are issued to finance public debt in the eurozone as a substitute to national debt. 
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Nevertheless, national governments have to pay interest on issued Eurobonds. Southern 
countries must be committed to stabilize their public debt. 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1) . ( 1)
n
n
n
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
d
If then
y
bt g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf reuro bte

               
  [14] 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1 ( 1 ) . )
s
s
s
s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
d
If then
y
bt g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf reuro bte

               
  [15] 
Each government may appeal the issuance of Eurobonds ( nbte  for the northern government and 
sbte  for the southern government). 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1)
n
n
n
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
d
If then
y
bte g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf ge

              
  [16] 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1)
s
s
s
s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
d
If then
y
bte g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf ge

              
  [17] 
The aggregate supply of Eurobonds is obtained by the sum of the two countries. 
 n sbte bte bte    [18] 
Demand for Eurobonds simply depends on the interest rate ( reuro ) and the level of GDP of 
the entire eurozone ( e n sy y y  ). 
 0
1
e e
e
reuro a y
bte
a

  
In the model, we use the following determination of interest rates: 
 0 1e e
e
bte
reuro a a
y
 
   
 
  [19] 
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Scenario 4: Issuance of Eurobonds and European projects 
To complete the previous scenario, Eurobonds are used as a tool to finance European projects 
in innovative sectors. Southern countries as well as northern countries can use Eurobonds in 
order to stimulate their economic growth. 
Scenario 5: Tax rebate and public expenditures cuts 
This scenario describes roughly the French “Crédit d'impôt pour la compétitivité et l'emploi 
(CICE)” and the “Pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité” the government reduces the social 
contributions paid by the firms to partly compensate the competitiveness loss due to the 
overvaluation ( 1.5trs   for 10ti   in period 10 in scenario 5). To avoid an increase of the 
public debt, public expenditures are cut in the same proportion (
1 ( 1)s gg sgs a gs trs   in period 
10 in scenario 6). However, these measures are not sufficiently devoted to the tradable sector 
and the total effect on employment, which is the other main target, is very uncertain. That is 
why the government toolkit includes also industrial policy measures such as innovation and 
technology policy or relocation policy. These measures are complex to design and to manage 
and their effects are only felt in the long run. As an illustration and in an optimistic way, it is 
assumed that after period 30 the non-price competitiveness of country s  is improved (the 
import income elasticity of country s , 1s  declines from 1 to 0.98 while the import income 
elasticity of country n , 1n  increases from 1 to 1.02 in scenario 7). 
3.3. Adjustments in the monetary union and economic policies 
In figure 3, we can observe the evolution of interest rates and public debt in the southern country 
in the baseline scenario (competitiveness loss in the southern country) and in the first four 
versions of the model. 
In the baseline scenario, we assume that any adjustment mechanism is implemented to face the 
competitiveness loss. Thus, this competitiveness loss widens the external deficit and in the same 
time increases the need of external financing. In addition, the negative impact of trade deficit 
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on the GDP implies a diminution of taxes collected by the government and thus an increase of 
the public deficit. On the Treasury bills market, interest rates increase alongside the debt 
increase and the slowdown of GDP. This “snowball” effect implies a tremendous increase in 
debt levels (140 percent of GDP in period 45) and of interest rates (4.5 percent in period 45). 
Figure 3: Evolutions of public debt and interest rate in the southern country 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
In order to eschew another “Greek drama”, European authorities can react by implementing 
various alternative economic policies in order to achieve more sustainable adjustments. 
In the first scenario, the government tries to reduce its public expenditures in order to prevent 
an increase of interest rates. The long run purpose of this policy is to reach a debt-to-GDP ratio 
limited to 70 percent. However, due to the Keynesian multiplier effect, public expenditures 
reduction puts a huge strain on economic activity as we can see in figure 4. Interest rates are 
reduced compared with the baseline scenario but still rise in the medium run and reach 2.8 
percent in period 45 due to a smaller demand of Treasury bills induced by the decline of the 
activity. 
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Figure 4: Relative GDP and current account in the southern country 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
In the second scenario, we assume that intra-zone financing is important thanks to an eased 
demand from private banks of the Northern countries or to the implementation of a European 
Stability Mechanism. This allows to keep interest rates at low level (2.4 percent in period 45) 
in spite of a huge increase of public debt-to-GDP ratio (130 percent in period 45). The negative 
impact on economic growth is largely offset in the long run but the competitiveness problem is 
not solved (see figure 4). We can recall that the Treaty ratified in March 2012 which gives an 
institutional background to the European Stability Mechanism stipulates that members States 
must reach a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent in the medium run. The results of the second 
scenario will be greatly affected if the goal targeted by the European Stability Mechanism was 
respected. In such a case the result in terms of relative growth rates would be largely similar to 
those of the first scenario. 
The third and the fourth scenario analyze the impact of an issuance of Eurobonds in the 
eurozone. We can observe that interest rates increase less rapidly in the fourth scenario than the 
third scenario. In the fourth scenario, Eurobonds finance investments in innovative sectors 
therefore economic growth is stronger and upward pressures on interest rates are weaker. 
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Figure 5: Relative GDP and public debt in the northern country 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
These growth gaps can be observed in the figure 4. We compute adjustments on GDP thanks to 
the following formula: 
      
    
 
 
competitiveness loss with adjustment competitiveness loss without adjustment
competitiveness loss without adjustment
GDP GDP
RelativeGDP
GDP


 
Initially, the GDP drops after the negative competitiveness shock. The implementation of 
European projects financed by Eurobonds (scenario 4) absorbs completely the competitiveness 
loss in the long run as GDP returns to its value before the shock in period 45. Eurobonds 
issuance to partially mutualize sovereign debt (scenario 3) induces a partial adjustment. We can 
observe that intra-zone financing (scenario 2) appears to be more efficient than Eurobonds 
issuance alone (scenario 3). The implementation of a European Stability Mechanism, aimed at 
providing low interest rates to governments and firms, stimulates investment. In terms of 
relative growth, the worst case is the first scenario where governments implement drastic budget 
cuts in order to achieve a debt-to-GDP ratio of 70 percent in the long run. The GDP drops by 
30 percent in relative terms in period 45. The slowdown of economic activity induces a decrease 
of imports and then a massive adjustment of the current account balance. Without any policy 
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reactions (baseline scenario) after the competitiveness loss, external deficits of the southern 
country steadily increase and reach 3.5 percent of GDP in period 45. In other scenarios, we 
observe a stabilization of the external deficit around 2 percent in the long run. 
Figure 6: Interest rate and public debt in scenario 3 and 4 
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In figure 5, we can analyze the consequences of the various scenarios in the northern country 
in terms of growth and public debt. Again, drastic budget cuts in the southern country have 
negative impact on economic activity (even) in the northern country. In the long run, the fall of 
GDP will bring public debt to 65 percent of GDP. In other scenarios, public debt increases less 
thanks to a stronger growth, particularly in the fourth scenario. 
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According to our numerical simulations, the emission of Eurobonds constitutes a useful tool to 
ensure a strong recovery in the entire eurozone. Figure 6 shows levels of public debt and 
evolution of interest rates on Treasury bills and Eurobonds in the third and the fourth scenario. 
As growth is stronger in the fourth scenario, interest rates on national T-bills are lower when 
Eurobonds play a role in financing the real economy. Conversely, the interest rate on Eurobonds 
is slightly higher in the fourth scenario (1.9 percent) than in the third scenario (1.6 percent). 
Regarding levels of public debt, again, European debt in Eurobonds is higher in the fourth (20 
percent of GDP) relatively to the third scenario (10 percent of GDP). Nevertheless, European 
indebtedness remains sustainable as well as national indebtedness in spite of the fact that 
national governments have to pay interests on these issued Eurobonds. 
We now move towards the last scenarios with tax rebate and public expenditures cuts. In 
scenario 5, the reduction of the social contributions paid by firms partly offsets the effect of 
overvaluation of the euro for southern countries and their loss of competitiveness. The GDP fall 
is less noticeable but the current account balance remains deteriorated while the public deficit 
and debt increase a lot, inducing a substantial increase of interest rates (see figure 7). To avoid 
this unsustainable worsening of the public finance, public expenditures are cut of an amount 
equivalent to the tax rebate (scenario 6). These cuts partially limit the rise of public debt and of 
the interest rate but at the expense of the GDP growth which returns to the depressed baseline 
scenario. 
This strategy of the French “Pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité” uses simultaneously the 
accelerator and the brake and can have only a limited effect. The initial tax rebate represents a 
high cost for the public finances without being targeted on the tradable sector, mainly due to 
European competition rules. The only way of escape would be the success of industrial and 
innovation policies able to improve at medium term the non-price competitiveness, as it is 
illustrated in the scenario 7. 
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Figure 7: Tax rebate and public expenditures cuts (scenarios 5 to 7) 
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4. Conclusion 
If European authorities do not react by implementing new economic policies to achieve 
sustainable adjustments, the intra-European exchange rates misalignments and the subsequent 
competitiveness loss in southern countries induce economic stagnation in southern countries. 
Current account imbalances will continue to diverge and public debt dynamics will not be 
stabilized. Restrictive fiscal policies, as they have been implemented in southern countries, can 
contain interest and public indebtedness but at the cost of a deeper recession. This policy-mix 
based on tax rebate to improve competitiveness and public expenditures cuts, illustrated by the 
French “Pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité”, has only a limited effect.  
Increasing intra-European financing by banks of northern countries or by the European Stability 
Mechanism or even by the intervention of the ECB itself could contribute to reduce the debt 
burden and induce a partial recovery. But the problem of competitiveness of the southern 
countries would not be solved and public debt would increase (scenario 2). 
Implementation of euro-bonds as a tool to partly mutualize European sovereign debt would 
have a rather similar positive impact, but with a public debt limited to 70 percent of GDP, which 
could be considered as an important advantage (scenario 3). Furthermore, Eurobonds could also 
be used to finance large European projects which could impulse a stronger recovery in the entire 
eurozone with stabilized current account imbalances (scenario 4). To improve non-price 
competitiveness, it could (and should) be completed by more structural policies (industrial and 
innovation policies) which are complex to implement and effective only in the long run. 
However, the creation of a European institution in charge of the emission of Eurobonds would 
face strong political obstacles. The northern countries fear that Eurobonds would give to the 
southern countries the opportunity to continue irrelevant policies. They would ask that the 
launching of Eurobonds would be accompanied by more restrictive fiscal policy in the respect 
of the Stability pact and by a stricter monitoring of national fiscal policies. This could generate 
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numerous political tensions between Member States. Actually, the European Stability 
Mechanism organizes the rescue of countries facing difficulties only under the condition of a 
strict control of the public finance. In such a configuration, Eurobonds would not be more 
efficient than the present institutional framework. On the opposite the southern countries could 
argue that a part of the debt induced by the overvaluation of their euro could be financed by 
Eurobonds without being subjected to tougher constraints. 
Ultimately, as pointed out by Stiglitz (2016), the efficiency of these institutional innovations 
inside the monetary union could be compared with an alternative framework where the 
possibility of intra-European exchange rate adjustments would be reintroduced thanks to a new 
type of monetary regime (cohabitation of a global euro with national euros, new European 
Monetary System with a euro reduced to a simple ECU, exit of the Germany or of southern 
countries).  
These various monetary regimes are a more straightforward solution to the problem of 
competitiveness of southern countries and allow a more efficient adjustment at short term, with 
a more balanced growth regime at medium term (Mazier and Valdecantos, 2015). They could 
also be completed by structural policies to improve non-price competitiveness. However, the 
main difficulty, raised by this alternative strategy, is the transition period which would be 
difficult to manage with the risk of capital flights and multiple bank crises. 
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Appendix A: Methodological note on the underlying current account 
A simple foreign trade model is used for all the countries with export and import equations for 
goods and services related to real exchange rates, domestic output gap for import and foreign 
output gap for export. The interested reader could consult the IMF occasional paper 167 in 
which this correction is completely described (Bayoumi and Faruqee, 1998). Lagged effects of 
exchange rate variations are spread on three years ( t  : 0.6; 1t   : 0.25 and 2t   : 0.15). Export 
price in domestic currency is independent from the real exchange rate while on the contrary 
import price in domestic currency depends immediately and completely of the exchange rate 
variation. The current account in percentage of GDP can be written as: 
       
   
1 20,6 0,25 0 15m x
m x
CA Y M Y X Y R R R M Y R
M Y YGAP X Y YGAPF
  
 
        
 
,
 
where YGAPF  is the average output gap of the main partners; R , the logarithm of the real 
exchange rate (an increase of R  indicates a depreciation); x , m , the long run export and 
import price elasticities, respectively; x , m , long run export and import volume elasticities, 
respectively. 
In case of real appreciation (a decrease of ), import in volume increases while exports 
decreases with lagged effects of the exchange rate variations but current account is improved 
thanks to cheaper imports. Last rising domestic output gap has a negative impact on current 
account while foreign output gap has an opposite effect. The underlying current account is the 
current account corrected by the effects of past and present exchange rate variations and by the 
effects of the domestic and foreign output gaps: 
     UND m xCA Y M Y X Y R M Y R         
By substitution, we obtain: 
     
   
10,4 0,15UND m x
m x
CA Y CA Y M Y X Y R R
M Y YGAP X Y YGAPF
 
 
       
 
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Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis  
Figure B1. Impact of a competitiveness loss on country S GDP (in percent relative to the baseline)  
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